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INDUSTRIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS

Corso ECONOMIA
Curriculum BEHAVIOURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
Anno Accademico 2024/2025
Anno 2
Crediti 8
Ore aula 48
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
Attività formativa A scelta dello studente
Ambito A scelta dello studente

Docente

Foto non disponibile
Responsabile Marcella Scrimitore
Crediti 8
Semestre Secondo Ciclo Semestrale

Informazioni dettagliate relative all'attività formativa

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS (24 hours)


Introduction (2 hours)


Oligopolistic competition (10 hours)

A review of game-theoretic models of oligopolistic behavior: Bertrand vs. Cournot

Firm strategic behaviour on public/private (mixed) markets

Horizontal product differentiation and oligopolistic competition: the Hotelling model

Models of vertical product differentiation


Horizontal mergers (2 hours)

Incentives towards horizontal mergers and the efficiency defence


Vertical relationships (4 hours)

The double marginalization problem in vertically-structured markets and the gains from vertical mergers

Vertical restraints and the efficiency of vertical chains


Cartels and collusion (6 hours)

The instability of cartels in one-shot games

Unraveling in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

Collusion sustainability under Cournot and Bertrand competition

Optimal punishments and partial collusion


ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION (24 hours)


Oligopoly and environmental taxation (8 hours)

The optimal Pigouvian policy in the short and the long run

Environmental taxation as an incentive towards innovation

Joint effects of profit and Pigouvian taxation

Competitive vs. cooperative green R&D with spillovers


Mergers, vertical relations and collusion under environmental regulation (4 hours)

Vertical relations under emission taxation and environmental innovation

Horizontal mergers under negative environmental externalities

The environmental consequences of cartel behaviour


Environmental quality and the Porter hypothesis (4 hours)

Profit incentives and quality distortions under environmental policy

Environmental quality and eco-labeling

Green vs. brown under Bertrand and Cournot competition


Mixed oligopoly and Corporate Social Responsibility (4 hours)

CSR in mixed oligopolies

Vertical relations with CSR

CSR and the stability of implicit collusion


Consumer environmental awareness (4 hours)

Environmentalism in a linear model à la Hotelling

Green consumerism and the supply of environmental quality





Ultimo aggiornamento: 24-09-2024

Lambertini, L. (2013). Oligopoly, the Environment and Natural Resources, Routledge.

Slides, handouts and exercises.


Ultimo aggiornamento: 24-09-2024

The course aims at providing students with the background and tools necessary to the analysis of imperfectly competitive markets and environmental policies in these markets. Industrial production and consumption patterns heavily rely on the intensive use of natural resources that creates concern for the environment. The need to regulate firm behaviour and ensure the sustainability of the economic system in the long run has found large consensus across scientists and policy makers. The course offers an overview for a better understanding of the determinants of firm behaviour in oligopolistic markets and in an antitrust perspective. By taking modern oligopoly theory as a benchmark, the course also deals with regulatory instruments, such as environmental taxation, and the way they interact with incentives towards collusion, horizontal and vertical mergers. It also examines firms’ incentives for green research and development (R&D) and environmental quality, as well as the role of corporate social responsibility, public firms and consumer environmental awareness as endogenous regulatory instruments.


Ultimo aggiornamento: 24-09-2024

Microeconomics of imperfect competitive markets; Game Theory (basics), Mathematics (basics).


Ultimo aggiornamento: 24-09-2024

Lectures, classes, seminars


Ultimo aggiornamento: 24-09-2024

Students are expected to demonstrate their knowledge and skills by participating in a 120-minute written examination (5 questions).



Ultimo aggiornamento: 24-09-2024


Ulteriori informazioni

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Ricevimenti di: Marcella Scrimitore
La Prof.ssa Marcella Scrimitore riceve gli studenti nell'Aula Docenti (D8) al termine delle lezioni dei corsi, e online, sulla piattaforma Microsoft Teams o Zoom, previa richiesta da inviare all'indirizzo: marcella.scrimitore@unirc.it (l'appuntamento verrà fissato nelle 24 ore successive alla richiesta).
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